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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
PRIVACY AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
Joseph A. Post*
INTRODUCTION
From the earliest days of its recognition as a legal concept, privacy
has been considered to have two aspects: the right to control the dis-
closure of personal information, and the right to be free of intrusions
into one's "personal space." Both of these interests are affected in
varying ways by communications networks such as those that will
comprise the information superhighway. On the one hand, the very
purpose of such networks is to deliver information, and the more ef-
fective a network is for that purpose, the greater is the potential it
creates for the transmission, capture, storage, and use of "private" in-
formation. It is overly simplistic, however, to regard communication
networks as mere threats to privacy whose development must strin-
gently be controlled. The more "intelligent" a network is, the greater
the capabilities it will confer on users to protect themselves from un-
wanted intrusions by controlling both inward and outward flows of
information. In short, the same advances in communications technol-
ogy that may threaten some privacy interests may also advance others.
Legislators, regulators, and market mechanisms will all play roles in
achieving some sort of a balance between these disparate and some-
times conflicting interests.
"Caller ID" service provides a paradigmatic case of such conflicts of
interest, and it will therefore be worthwhile to consider the service in
some detail before discussing more general issues related to privacy
and communications networks. As in the following section of this Re-
port dealing with universal service issues, the premise of this discus-
sion is that a consideration of legal and regulatory questions that have
arisen in connection with existing communications networks will pro-
vide some insight into the issues that are likely to arise in the future as
technology evolves, new infrastructure is deployed, and a wide variety
of new services come to be offered.
I. A PARADIGMATIC CASE: CALLER ID
In the early days of telephony, most calls were mediated by human
operators, and the custom was for the operator to identify the calling
party to the person being called. With the advent of direct dialing, the
role of the operator diminished, and callers gained the ability to make
calls without disclosing who they were or where they were calling
from. Perhaps as a vestige of the older pattern, however, common
* The author represented New York Telephone Company in proceedings before
the New York State Public Service Commission relating to Caller ID and in a variety
of other proceedings relating to some of the subjects covered herein. Any views ex-
pressed in this discussion are, of course, the author's own.
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opinion continued to support the idea that the caller should be identi-
fied. In a recent paper, James Katz assembled extracts from several
etiquette books supporting the existence of this custom 4" and noted
that "[n]either is this opinion a recent one; in fact it has been a bul-
wark of social practice throughout, and before, this century. 478 Nev-
ertheless, whatever etiquette may dictate, the fact is that, in most
cases, callers can conceal their identity, or at least the number of the
telephone line from which they are calling.
In recent years, telephone companies have been deploying a new
technology known as common channel signaling. Such technology es-
sentially entails the delivery of information related to the call ("signal-
ing" information) on a separate set of communications paths from
those used to transport the call itself. Common channel signaling
technology creates a number of network efficiencies, but it has also
led to the development of new telecommunications services that util-
ize the more detailed signaling information that can be delivered over
common channel signaling networks. One such service is Caller ID,
which allows the called party to see the telephone number of the line
from which a call originates. The number is shown on a small display
device that can be purchased separately or as part of an integrated
telephone set. The number appears on the display between the first
and second rings.
As telephone companies began introducing Caller ID in the late
1980s, a number of groups objected to the perceived invasion of their
privacy that the service represented, and state regulatory bodies held
numerous hearings on privacy questions raised by Caller ID!' 7 9 The
interests canvassed in these cases were wide-ranging. On the positive
side, Caller lID gave those who used the service greater control over
incoming calls and over the manner in which they were handled.
Small businesses pointed to the potential use of Caller ID for verifying
caller identity, preventing fraud, and otherwise facilitating telephone
transactions with customers. Many claimed that the deployment of
the service deterred annoying, threatening, or obscene telephone calls,
or at least facilitated the identification and apprehension of those who
477. James E. Katz, Sociological Perspectives on Caller-ID Privacy 5-7 (Dec. 20,
1989) (Bell Communications Research Tech. Mem. TM-ARH-015905).
478. 1& at 6.
479. See, e.g., Opinion and Order Authorizing Caller ID Service 52-53, Case 91-C-
0428, Opinion No. 92-5 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n April 9, 1992) (addressing New
York's decision to allow Caller ID devices); see also Re Southern New England Tel.
Co., 134 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 124,128-30 (Conn. Dep't Pub. Util. Control 1992)
(discussing research on the consumer demand of Caller ID in Connecticut); Re US
West Communications, Inc., 131 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 486, 500-04 (Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n 1992) (expressing Arizona's concern with "the privacy implications resulting
from approval of ... Caller ID"); Re Diamond State Tel Co., 121 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 317, 329-32 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1991) (regarding Delaware's Caller
ID concerns).
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made such calls. Emergency service providers testified to the use of
the service in identifying emergency callers.
Those opposed to Caller ID testified about the potential use of the
service by businesses to assemble telemarketing lists, the interests of
telephone "hotlines" (e.g., suicide prevention lines) in being able to
give their clients confidence that they could call anonymously, the in-
terests of law enforcement agencies in preventing subjects of investi-
gations from identifying the source of calls from undercover agents,
the interests of victims of domestic violence in being able to take ref-
uge in shelters and to call their spouses or children without disclosing
their whereabouts, and the interest of doctors, teachers, and other
professionals in being able to call their patients, pupils, or clients from
their homes without disclosing their home telephone numbers.
Masses of evidence were produced concerning the importance of
each of these interests, the likely impact of Caller ID on such inter-
ests, and the existence of alternative ways of advancing or protecting
them if the offering of Caller ID was or was not approved. Many of
the interests on both sides may properly be characterized as privacy
interests. As a general matter, Caller ID may be said to advance one
form of privacy by affording its users a way to protect themselves from
incoming (telephonic) intrusions, while impacting another form of pri-
vacy by allowing the disclosure of assertedly "private" information
(i.e., the number of the telephone line that the caller is using).
Different states have reached different conclusions about how the
service should be offered.4a1 One fairly common solution, adopted in
New York, among other states, has been to allow the offering of Caller
ID, but to give the caller the ability to "block," or prevent display of
the calling number. If the caller exercises this option, the Caller ID
subscriber sees the letter "P" or the word "PRIVATE" on the display
device. It might be thought that this option renders the service value-
less, but the appearance of the "P" or "PRIVATE" on the Caller ID
device itself conveys information (i.e., the caller's choice to use a
"blocking" option), that the subscriber may want to take into account
in deciding whether to answer the call or how to handle it. Although
the ultimate merits of this solution can be debated, it is at least one
480. The evidentiary records that were assembled in these cases are far too detailed
to summarize effectively here, but suffice it to say that a number of legitimate inter-
ests were identified on both sides of the question.
481. The matter has also been considered by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion in the context of interstate calls. See Rules and Policies Regarding Calling
Number Identification Service-Caller ID, Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 9 F.C.C.R. 1764 (1994).
The FCC's resolution of the issue differed from the decisions reached by a number
of states, raising questions related to the desirability of having inconsistent Caller ID
requirements for interstate and intrastate calls originating from the same line. See
Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service-Caller ID,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, Second Report and Order and
Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1995 FCC Lexis 3088 (1995).
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that attempts to balance and accommodate the privacy interests on
both sides of the equation.
This balance of conflicting interests has been taken perhaps one
step further by the offering in some states of a service known as
"anonymous call rejection," which allows telephone subscribers to au-
tomatically reject calls for which the calling number information has
been suppressed. Such calls would be routed to a recording which
advises the caller that the called party chooses not to accept "blocked"
calls.
There are, perhaps, two lessons to be drawn from the Caller ID
experience in considering how privacy issues will and should be han-
dled in the context of the information superhighway. First, there is
the danger of framing the issue as a balance between privacy and
something else. Both the delivery and the suppression of information
simultaneously protect and impair privacy, and the task is to find a
way to identify, measure, balance, and accommodate these conflicting
interests. Second, there is the need to recognize that technology is
both the problem and the solution. Although technology provides
new and richer sources of information, it also provides the way for
network users to control the flow of such information. The same tech-
nology that enables Caller ID also gives callers the means to prevent
delivery of their numbers and gives called parties the means to avoid
(or reroute, or otherwise manage) unwelcome calls.
Caller ID is but one example of the ways in which privacy issues
have been considered in recent years in the context of communica-
tions networks and services. Although the precise nature of these is-
sues will change as technology evolves, the general problems-
relating to the way in which the generation, transmission, storage, and
use of information should be controlled, and who should be entitled to
exercise such control-will persist as current networks evolve into the
information superhighway of the future. It will therefore be useful to
consider some of the issues that have arisen in recent years. A
helpful and somewhat more detailed survey of many of these issues
can be found in a recent Notice of Inquiry issued by the National Tele-
communications and Information Administration.183
482. Because the purpose of this Report is to identify general types of privacy is-
sues that are likely to be raised in connection with the information superhighway, it
does not attempt a detailed restatement of all existing or proposed law and regula-
tions-state, federal, and international-relating to privacy in telecommunications.
The examples discussed below are offered for illustrative purposes only.
No attempt is made to address transnational legal issues related to privacy. For a
discussion of some of those issues, see, for example, Robert G. Boehmer & Todd S.
Palmer, The 1992 EC Data Protection Proposa" An Examination of Its Implications
for U.S. Business and U.S. Privacy Law, 31 Am. Bus. IJ. 265 (1993).
483. Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunica-
tions-Related Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 6842 (1994) [hereinafter NTIA
Notice].
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II. SOME PRIVACY ISSUES RAISED BY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
A. Who Is Calling?
One of the most important issues relating to privacy on communica-
tions networks is the question of the extent to which a network user
should be permitted to communicate or otherwise interact anony-
mously with another user. Where both parties choose anonymity, no
significant privacy issues would seem to be raised. The question, then,
is what should happen where less than all of the participants to a com-
munications transaction agree to anonymity.
The issues raised by Caller ID have already been considered. Simi-
lar issues have been raised by a different calling number delivery tech-
nology known as "Automatic Number Identification," or ANI. ANI is
a field of data provided by a telephone company to certain of its cus-
tomers in connection with the delivery of calls to those customers. In
contrast with Caller ID-type signaling data delivered in common chan-
nel signaling networks, ANI information is traditionally provided "in
band," that is, on the same communications path as the call itself.
Since ANI does not depend upon the existence of common channel
signaling, it predates such technology by decades.
In general, telephone networks are not designed to transmit ANI
information end-to-end along with a call. For that reason the service
was never used as the basis for an alternative consumer Caller ID ser-
vice. Rather, its principal use has been in connection with the "hand-
off" of calls between carriers. For example, when a long distance
telephone call originates on a local telephone company's network, the
call must be delivered to the long distance (interexchange) carrier that
will carry the call to the called party's local telephone company. The
customary billing arrangement for such a call is that the caller is billed
only by the interexchange carrier, and not by the local telephone com-
panies at either end of the call.4" To enable the interexchange carrier
to identify the customer to be billed, the originating local telephone
company delivers ANI information to that carrier along with the call
itself 485
In addition to using ANI for billing purposes, some carriers also
"repackage" the information, including it as a component of the serv-
ices they offer to call recipients. For example, the 800-number serv-
ices offered by some interexchange carriers provide for the optional
484. The local telephone companies bill the interexchange carrier for the service of
"originating" or "terminating" the call.
485. The Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"), discussed in the following sec-
tion of this Report, requires Bell Operating Companies to "provide to all inter-
exchange carrers... exchange access... on an unbundled, tariffed basis, that is equal
in type, quality, and price to that provided to AT&T and its affiliates." United States
v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). "Ex-
change access" is defined to include "Automatic Number Identification." Id. at 228.
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delivery of ANI information to the business subscribing to the 800
number. Businesses that purchase ANI-based services can use ANI
for a variety of purposes, including customer identity verification and
the facilitation of retail transactions (e.g., the customer's records can
automatically be retrieved while the call is being answered). Of
course, ANI can also be used to assemble lists of numbers for
telemarketing purposes.
Because ANI is conceptually similar to Caller ID (both entail the
delivery of the calling number to the party called),48 it might be
thought that similar regulatory frameworks would apply to the two
services. In fact, the privacy "solution" adopted by many state com-
missions in the Caller ID context-caller-directed blocking-cannot
be implemented for ANI because existing network technology does
not permit the calling party to be given the capability of blocking de-
livery of in-band ANI information except by blocking the call itself.
Moreover, even if it were technologically feasible to do so, allowing
callers to block ANI would impair the ability of interexchange carriers
to conduct their own billing and collection, thus forcing them to rely
on local telephone company-provided billing and collection services.
Thus, caller-directed blocking could raise significant issues relating to
telecommunications competition.
Accordingly, regulators have focused on an alternative regulatory
approach, under which local telephone companies and other carriers
may be required to condition the delivery of ANI information on the
recipients' agreement to abide by certain restrictions regarding the use
to which that information may be put.487 For example, certain restric-
tions might be imposed on the use of such information for the purpose
of assembling marketing lists. ANI regulation thus affords an alterna-
tive model for preventing the abuse of calling party identification in-
formation: restricting the use of the information rather than
preventing its delivery.
B. User Directories
Local telephone companies publish "White Pages" directories list-
ing the names, phone numbers, and addresses of their customers.
Customers generally have the option of excluding themselves from
486. As a technical matter, Caller ID delivers the telephone number of the line
from which the call originates, while ANI delivers the number to which the call is
billed. For well over 95% of lines, the two numbers are the same. Some multiline
business customers, however, may choose to bill all or some portion of their lines to a
single telephone number, even though the lines themselves each have different
numbers.
487. See Opinion and Order Concerning ANI Terms and Conditions 10, 12-13,
Cases 89-C-191 & 90-C-0165, Opinion No. 92-37 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 3,
1992). As a practical matter, such restrictions would not need to be embodied in
separate agreements, but could be included in the carriers' tariffs for their AN-re-
lated services.
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such listings by purchasing "non-published number" service. The
purchase of this service precludes a customer from appearing in
printed directories or in directory assistance databases. Additionally,
state law may provide additional restrictions applicable to such cus-
tomers. For example, the New York Public Service Law provides that
"[n]o telegraph corporation or telephone corporation shall sell or of-
fer for sale any names and/or addresses of any of its customers whose
listings have been omitted from the telephone company's published
directory at the request of the customer. ' 488
Given the decision that customers should be allowed to exclude
themselves from directories, questions arise as to the appropriate
charge to impose for the exercise of the option. Rates currently
charged by telephone companies for the service are not necessarily
cost-based, but may reflect the diminution of the value of the direc-
tory to other customers that is created by a customer's decision to
"opt out."489 Pricing decisions, just like other decisions relating to the
terms and conditions on which a privacy-affecting service will be of-
fered, require a sensitive balancing of competing interests in the use of
and control over information.49 °
488. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 91(5) (McKinney 1989).
489. As the New York Public Service Commission recognized:
Nonpublished service was first charged for in 1960, at which time it was rec-
ognized that a deterrent charge was necessary because nonpublished service
was growing rapidly. When this happens, the value of telephone service to
all subscribers is diminished since they have difficulty in communicating with
subscribers whose telephone numbers are unlisted.
Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules, Regula-
tions and Classifications of the New York Telephone Company 345, 397, Case 25155
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n July 1, 1970).
490. In a September 1991 Revised Statement of Policy on Privacy in Telecommuni-
cations, the New York Public Service Commission stated:
Considerations of cost, public policy, economics, and technology all bear on
the pricing of privacy features, which must be determined case-by-case. In
general, customers choosing a feature that simply protects a pre-existing pri-
vacy level against a new service should not be charged for doing so; custom-
ers choosing a greater degree of privacy could reasonably be required to pay
its costs. These presumptions could be overcome by reasonable showings in
particular cases.
Revised Statement of Principles on Privacy in Telecommunications 2, Case 90-C-0075
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Revised Statement]. This was
but one of eight "principles" or guidelines included in the Revised Statement. The
Revised Statement as a whole provides an interesting conceptual framework for re-
viewing privacy issues, and it is thus worth quoting in more detail:
1. Privacy should be recognized explicitly as an issue to be considered in in-
troducing new telecommunications services....
2. The interest in an open network should be recognized in evaluating alterna-
tive means for protecting privacy.... [P]rotective measures should be cus-
tomer-specific where technically feasible and economically practical, and
allowing customers to erect barriers to network access would be preferred to
establishing automatic barriers that customers would have to overcome....
3. Companies should educate their customers as to the implications for pri-
vacy of the services they offer....
[Vol. 64
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C. Disclosure of Records Related to the Use of the Nenvork
A customer's use of a telecommunications network generates a
great deal of information. Thus, questions arise as to what restric-
tions, if any, should be imposed on the use and disclosure of such in-
formation. As with calling number information, this issue has been
addressed in different contexts under different, and perhaps not en-
tirely consistent, legal and regulatory frameworks. Several of these
frameworks are discussed in this subsection.
1. Cable Act
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984491 restricts cable
companies' use of information about subscribers' viewing choices. As
summarized in the NTIA Notice of Inquiry cited above:
The 1984 Cable Act precludes cable operators or third parties from
monitoring the viewing habits of cable subscribers. Under the sub-
scriber privacy provisions of that Act, cable operators are required
to inform their subscribers at the time of entering into a contractual
arrangement, and annually thereafter, of the nature of the "person-
ally identifiable information" they collect about subscribers, their
data disclosure practices, and subscriber rights to inspect and cor-
rect errors in such data. Cable operators are prohibited from using
the cable system to collect personally identifiable information about
their subscribers, except that which is necessary to render cable ser-
vice, without subscriber consent, and are generally barred from dis-
closing such data to third parties without written or electronic
consent. Cable operators may sell their mailing lists to third parties
4. People should be permitted to choose among various degrees of privacy
protection, with respect to both the outflow of information about themselves
and the receipt of incoming intrusions.
5. A telephone company offering a new service that compromised current pri-
vacy expectations would be obligated to offer a means of restoring the lost
degree of privacy unless it showed good cause for not doing so.
6. Considerations of cos public policy, economics, and technology all bear
on the pricing of privacy features, which must be determined case-by-case. In
general, customers choosing a feature that simply protects a pre-existing pri-
vacy level against a new service should not be charged for doing so; custom-
ers choosing a greater degree of privacy could reasonably be required to pay
its costs. These presumptions could be overcome by reasonable showings in
particular cases.
7. Unless a subscriber grants informed consent, subscriber-specific informa-
tion generated by the subscriber's use of a telecommunications service should
be used only in connection with rendering or billing for that service or for
other goods or services requested by the subscriber...
8. Privacy expectations may change over time requiring in some instances,
changes in telecommunications services. At the same time, changes in tele-
communications technology services and markets may lead to changes in cus-
tomers' privacy expectations.
Id. at 1-3.
491. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-613 (1988), amended by Cable Television Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (Supp. V 1993).
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only if they have given their subscribers an opportunity to limit such
disclosure, and the disclosure does not reveal the viewing habits or
other transactions of the subscriber.
The 1992 Cable Act extended the protections of the 1984 Cable
Act to new wire and radio services that may be provided over cable
facilities, such as personal communications services (PCS). It also
requires cable operators to take actions necessary to prevent unau-
thorized access to personal information by persons other than the
subscriber or cable operator.
Thus, a cable operator's actions with respect to information about
their customers is severely restricted.
2. Video Privacy Act
The federal Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 493 and similar
state laws,4 94 limit the dissemination of information relating to video
cassette rentals and sales. Such laws arose out of disclosures relating
to the possible use of video rental information in the confirmation
hearings for Supreme Court Justice-designate Robert Bork, and ap-
parently reflect perceptions that information on video viewing habits
are particularly private and personal.
3. ECPA
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, as amended by the federal Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 (the "ECPA"),495 imposes certain limitations on the dis-
closure of information relating to electronic communications.496 The
law reflects interesting dichotomies between the treatment of disclo-
sures to governmental entities on the one hand, and internal use or
492. NTIA Notice, supra note 483, at 6844 (footnotes omitted) (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 551 (Supp. V 1993)).
493. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
494. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 670-675 (McKinney Supp. 1995) ("Video
Consumer Privacy Act"); see also NTIA Notice, supra note 483, at 6844 n.24 (citing
examples of state video privacy laws).
495. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (1968), as amended by Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 88 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (1994)).
496. The primary focus of the ECPA is on regulating the interception of communi-
cations. "Intercept," as used in the statute, "means the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994) (emphasis ad-
ded). Wiretapping and other forms of interception obviously raise another class of
privacy concerns, which are not addressed in this section of the Report. Rather, the
focus of this section is on the ECPA chapter dealing with access to records of "elec-
tronic communications." Id. §8 2701-2711 (1994).
"Electronic communication service" is defined in the ECPA to include "any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic com-
munications." Id § 2510(15).
[Vol. 64
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disclosure to private third parties on the other. 97 For example,
§ 2703(c) deals separately with the disclosure of records to "govern-
mental entities" and persons other than governmental entities. Dis-
closure may be made to governmental entities only under certain
limited conditions (e.g., where a warrant is issued).498 The statute
adds, however, that "a provider of electronic communication service
or remote computing service may disclose a record or other informa-
tion pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not in-
cluding the contents of [such] communications ... ) to any person
other than a governmental entity."419
4. CPNI
"Customer proprietary network information, or CPNI, encom-
passes any information about customers' network services and their
use of those services that a telephone company possesses because it
provides those network services."500 The FCC has promulgated rules
that govern the use of CPNI by Bell Operating Companies, GTE, and
AT&T in the marketing by those companies of "enhanced services"
and customer premises equipment °0 The principal, original purpose
of such restrictions was to ensure fair competition between (a) local
telephone companies that may both provide basic services (and thus
have access to CPNI related to those services) and provide enhanced
services, and (b) competing enhanced service providers. In effect, the
rules seek to prevent telephone companies that generate CPNI
through their relationship with basic service customers from gaining
an unfair advantage in the marketing of their enhanced services.
In general, the FCC's rules require both competing enhanced ser-
vice providers and telephone company enhanced services marketing
personnel to obtain prior customer authorization before obtaining ac-
cess to CPNI for customers with more than twenty lines. Telephone
company enhanced services personnel may, however, obtain access to
497. Special concerns over governiental uses of information are also reflected in
the Privacy Act of 1974, which has been amended three times since 1974, and in a
number of other federal statutes. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
498. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (1994).
499. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
500. Additional Comment Sought on Rules Governing Telephone Companies' Use
of Customer Proprietary Network Information, 9 F.C.C.R. 1685 (1994) (public
notice).
501. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing FCC
regulation of "enhanced services"), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3593, 3608
(U.S. Feb. 14, 1995).
Enhanced services are "services, offered over common carrier transmission facili-
ties used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applica-
tions that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the
subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information."
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1994). "Voicemail," for example, is considered an enhanced
service, because it involves customer interaction with stored information.
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CPNI for customers having less than twenty lines; competing en-
hanced service providers must obtain prior customer authorization.
Any customer can request that its CPNI be withheld both from com-
peting enhanced service providers and telephone company marketing
personnel.
Although developed primarily for purposes related to competition,
the CPNI rules do reflect customer privacy concerns. In a March,
1994 release, the FCC solicited comments on "customers' CPNI-re-
lated privacy expectations, and whether any changes in [their] rules
[were] required to achieve the best balance between customer's pri-
vacy interests, competitive equity, and efficiency.""5 2
5. New York Public Service Commission Privacy Principles
As noted above, the New York Public Service Commission issued a
policy statement on privacy in telecommunications, in the form of a
set of eight privacy guidelines or "principles." Principle No. 7 states
that: "Unless a subscriber grants informed consent, subscriber-specific
information generated by the subscriber's use of a telecommunications
service should be used only in connection with rendering or billing for
that service or for other goods or services requested by the sub-
scriber."5 °3 In a petition for reconsideration of an earlier version of
the Commission's Statement of Policy, New York Telephone Com-
pany stated, in pertinent part:
Principle No. 7 has potentially broad application, and as adopted it
would deter a number of legitimate and beneficial uses of sub-
scriber-specific information. Particularly important in this regard is
the use of such information by the Company itself. The Company,
like most business enterprises, uses data gathered from its business
activities (including "subscriber-specific" information) in efforts to
improve and extend the services it offers. For example:
The Company... seeks to provide its customers with the services
and features that will best and most economically meet their
needs. For example, the Company might review a customer's ser-
vice records to determine if there is a more economical service
option available to the customer ....
As drafted, Principle No. 7 would all but preclude such activities,
thus hindering, rather than advancing, the interests of the Com-
pany's subscribers.504
In its September 20, 1991 order revising the Statement of Policy, the
Commission addressed this argument as follows:
502. Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, FCC 94-63 (Mar. 10,
1994).
503. See supra note 490.
504. Petition of New York Telephone Company for Reconsideration of the Com-
mission's Statement of Policy Concerning Privacy in Telecommunications 3-4, Case
90-C-0075 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 22, 1991).
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Nor is any change warranted by the various ways in which New
York Telephone says it uses these data.... [I]nsofar as the principle
bars use of the information for aggressive telemarketing, that was its
intention, and there is no reason to allow a telephone company to
do what other marketers may not.
In discouraging aggressive telemarketing, of course, we do not
mean to bar a telephone company from using subscriber-specific in-
formation to bring to a customer's attention service modifications
that might benefit the customer. Because the principles are guide-
lines and presumptions only, they allow for that flexibility, and a
telephone company would not be regarded as having violated an
interest protected by Principle No. 7 if it made judicious use of sub-
scriber-specific information in bringing potentially beneficial service
modifications to the attention of customers. 505
These statutes, rules, and principles raise interesting questions about
the extent to which the use of "transactional" information related to
the use of a communications network should be restricted. Does pub-
lic policy support a different level of restrictions on the use of such
information by service providers themselves, and the disclosure of
such information to third parties? Does disclosure to governmental
entities raise significantly different concerns than disclosure to private
third parties? To what extent should service providers be required to
notify customers of their disclosure practices and give customers the
right to opt out? Are there particular categories of information which
deserve especially stringent levels of protection? These issues will all
have to be addressed in the context of new telecommunications
technologies.
CONCLUSION
Each of the concerns discussed above is raised, or will be raised in
some form, by the information superhighway. Like traditional tele-
phone networks, the superhighway, in whatever form it eventually
manifests itself, will generate transactional records containing argua-
bly personal information, will permit anonymous interactions, and will
create a vehicle for intrusive and unsolicited commercial solicitation.
The statutes, cases, and principles discussed above will provide a start-
ing point for analyzing and resolving such concerns.
505. Revised Statement, supra note 490, at 16-17.
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